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TRUTHFULNESS IN NEGOTIATION
Thomas F. Guernsey*
I. INTRODUCTION
A great deal has been written on truthfulness in trial advocacy.1
In his talks and writing, Monroe Freedman sparked the most cur-
rent version of the debate,2 though the debate is much older.3
Given the age of this debate, it is surprising to find that there has
been little discussion of truthfulness in the related area of negotia-
tion. A survey of law review articles, cases and ethical opinions
reveals little in the way of discussion or guidance.4 Indeed, books
prepared on negotiation are quite limited in their consideration of
the ethical issues involved.5
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility6 and the A.B.A.
* Assistant Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond;
B.A., University of Michigan, 1973; J.D., Wayne State University, 1976; LL.M., Temple Uni-
versity, 1980.
The author wishes to thank Alice Thornton Meadows, a second year student at the T. C.
Williams School of Law, for her valuable assistance in preparing this article.
1. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERsARY SYSTEM (1975); Curtis, The
Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1951); Drinker, Some Remarks on Mr. Curtis' "The
Ethics of Advocacy," 4 STAN. L. REv. 349 (1952); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a
Professional System, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 191 (1978); Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for
Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060 (1975); Greenbaum, Attorneys' Problems in Making Ethical
Decisions, 52 IND. L.J. 627 (1977); Lawry, Lying, Confidentiality, and the Adversary Sys-
tem of Justice, 1977 UTAH L. Rv. 653; Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of
Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921; Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A
Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1067 (1975).
2. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at vii; Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966)
(initially presented as a lecture).
3. Pye, supra note 1, at 922.
4. See Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing With Oppos-
ing Parties, 33 S.C.L. Rzv. 181 (1981); Lawry, supra note 1; Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers'
Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577 (1975); White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical
Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 926. See generally
King & Sears, The Ethical Aspects of Compromise, Settlement and Arbitration, 25 ROCKY
MTN. L. REv. 454 (1953).
5. Two exceptions are G. BELLOW AND B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS (1978) (ne-
gotiation chapter reprinted as G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, NEGOTIATION (1978)), and H. ED-
WARDS & J. WHITE, PROBLEMS, READINGS AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR
(1976).
6. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979).
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct7 provide only general state-
ments covering truthfulness. Specifically, DR 7-102(A)(5) of the
Code provides that "[iln his representation of a client, a lawyer
shall not knowingly make a false statement of law or fact."8 Model
Rule 4.1 provides that
[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not:
(a) Knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third
person; or
(b) Knowingly fail to disclose a fact to a third person when:
(1) In the circumstances failure to make the disclosure is
equivalent to making a material misrepresentation;
(2) Disclosure is necessary to prevent assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act, as required by Rule 1:2(d); or
(3) Disclosure is necessary to comply with other law.'
Interestingly, the debate which has been waged in the trial advo-
cacy area has resulted in various guidelines.10 It has been sug-
gested, however, that there is no general overriding principle to
govern truthfulness in negotiations." The solution of the Model
Rules is to rely, to a large extent, on existing "conventions" to de-
termine truthfulness and false statements."2
II. RELIANCE ON CONVENTIONS CAUSES PROBLEMS
Treating the question of truthfulness as being governed by con-
ventions causes numerous problems. One such problem is the diffi-
culty of determining among what community of lawyers to meas-
ure conventions. Further, on a related point, the Reporter for the
Model Rules himself has pointed out that the "lack of consensus
indicates that lawyers, at least nationally, do not share a common
conception of fairness in the process of negotiation."1 " If there is a
lack of consensus on the nebulous concept of "fairness," it seems
likely there can be little agreement on the equally nebulous con-
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
8. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1979). DR 1-102(A)(4)
also provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving . . . fraud . . . or
misrepresentation."
9. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 4.1 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
10. See, e.g., I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE chs. 3, 4 (2d ed. 1980). See gener-
ally supra note 1.
11. See infra text accompanying note 21.
12. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 4.1 comment (Proposed Final Draft
1981); see Hazard, supra note 4.
13. Hazard, supra note 4, at 193.
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cept of "truthfulness." Lawyers are left then with both their own
interpretation of the appropriate conventions, and their own deci-
sions whether the opposing side is governed by the same conven-
tions. Articulation of these conventions would provide, at a mini-
mum, guidance for the lawyer wishing to act ethically while
avoiding disclosure harmful to the client.14
Another problem with conventions is that they differ not only
geographically but by "strata" within the profession.'6 Lawyers in
criminal trial practice, for example, have conventions considerably
different from those of lawyers in securities exchange practice."'
Difficulties arise when one stratum confronts another, just as when
one geographic area confronts another. In the words of Hazard:
"Lawyers in other strata of the professional community have their
own conventions. When levels are crossed, the less sophisticated
lawyer must decide whether to trust the opponent or to associate
someone else, research into the night, or perhaps even abort the
transaction."1 7 To the extent that reliance on conventions perpetu-
ates a system in which members of the same profession must meet
widely different minimum levels of ethics (and, at least implicitly,
competence) such reliance appears to do a great disservice to cli-
ents."' Lawyers' ethics are so often drawn into question these days
that officially to approve varying standards seems unacceptable.19
The result of varying standards is to reinforce less ethical
practice.20
Codification of rules is certainly not the solution. As has been
pointed out:
Pious and generalized assertions that the negotiator must be
"honest" or that the lawyer must use "candor" are not helpful. They
are at too high a level of generality, and they fail to appreciate the
14. Id. at 195; see infra text accompanying note 70.
15. See Hazard, supra note 4, at 193-94; White, supra note 4, at 927.
16. See Hazard, supra note 4, at 193-94; White, supra note 4, at 927. Lawyers in criminal
trial practice, for example, have conventions considerably different from those in Security
and Exchange Commission practice.
17. Hazard, supra note 4, at 195.
18. Id. at 196.
19. See generally Brazil, The Attorney as Victim: Toward More Candor About the Psy-
chological Price Tag of Litigation Practice, 3 J. LEGAL PROF. 107, 113 (1978) ("A system
that virtually compels this kind of behavior invites disrespect for itself and promotes the
development of undesirable psychological characteristics in the human beings who run it.").
20. The suggestion could be made that existing conventions should be changed. See gen-
erally M. FRANKEL, PARTIsAN JuSTIcE (1980); Rubin, supra note 4.
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
fact that truth and truthful behavior at one time in one set of cir-
cumstances with one set of negotiators may be untruthful in another
circumstance with other negotiators.21
Indeed, general assertions are not helpful and are, perhaps, even
counterproductive.22 To some extent, the acceptable puffery in one
situation would clearly be unethical in other situations under pres-
ent views on ethics.23 Certainly more can be done, however, than
simply "proscribe fraud. '24 We can just as certainly begin to de-
velop guidelines as to what circumstances dictate what definition
of truthfulness.
If conventions control ethical conduct, there are a host of cir-
cumstances that will affect "appropriate" behavior in a negotia-
tion 5 As stated in the comments to the discussion draft of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "[t]he precise contours of
the legal duties concerning disclosure, representation, puffery,
overreaching, and other aspects of honesty in negotiations cannot
be concisely stated. '26
To say rules cannot be developed, however, raises perhaps the
most important problem of reliance on conventions. Such reliance
on conventions may very well inhibit discussion as to what the ex-
isting conventions are and whether particular conventions are ap-
propriate. Further, such reliance tends to ignore what limited guid-
ance does exist in case law and in opinions on ethics. Existing
authority, for example, raises serious questions about what many
might feel are appropriate conventions.2 7
It is correct to say that lawyers seeking determination of ethical
standards in negotiation are, in fact, "hunting for the rules of the
game as the game is played in that particular circumstance."28 The
question becomes, why the rules are not stated beforehand more
specifically. Fraud is already proscribed in the law of contracts and
in the criminal law. Both areas of law are highly situational, yet
still subject to some overriding principles. Puffery for example is
21. White, supra note 4, at 929.
22. Id. at 938.
23. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
24. Hazard, supra note 4, at 196.
25. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
26. White, supra note 4, at 931 n.15 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 4.2 comment (Discussion Draft 1980)).
27. See, e.g., infra notes 36, 73 and accompanying text.
28. White, supra note 4, at 929.
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permitted, but case law determines what is puffing, what is lying.
Why should the area of negotiation be different?
Given the private nature of negotiation, case law does not de-
velop and, given this private nature, rules are of limited enforce-
ment value. Two solutions, however, come to mind. First, discus-
sion could provide guidance to those seeking to act ethically.
Second, absent a discussion, the profession should accept the fact
that there is no guidance. Hence, the alternative suggestion: When
it comes to truthfulness the rule is caveat lawyer.
III. ALTERNATIVE ONE: To ARTICULATE CONVENTIONS
The usefulness of discussion in sorting out the problems raised
by relying on conventions can be illustrated by an examination of
some relatively straightforward negotiation tactics designed to con-
ceal information.2 For purposes of demonstrating these tactics,30
assume a simple borrower-lender negotiation. Borrower wishes to
obtain from a bank at least five million dollars at no more than the
prime interest rate plus four percent. Borrower needs the money
badly and does not see any source other than this lender; all other
banks have turned him down. Lender is in a situation where it
desires to expand its commercial loan activity and, after some pre-
liminary investigation of borrower (looked at books, for example),
believes borrower is a good credit risk. Accordingly, lender is will-
ing to lend up to eight million dollars for a minimum interest rate
of prime plus two percent.
29. Negotiation has been characterized "as a process of adjustment of existing differences,
with a view to the establishment of a mutually more desirable legal relation by means of
barter and compromise.... It is accomplished consensually as contrasted with force of
law." G. BELLOW & B. MoULToN, supra note 5, at 440 (quoting Mathews, Negotiation: A
Pedagogical Challenge, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 93, 94 (1953)). Crucial to such a process is the
transfer of information between participants. G. WmLAms, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION
19 (1981). It is, of course, during the transfer of this information that the issue of truthful-
ness arises.
30. The tactics to be discussed were chosen for two reasons. First, they all are related in
that they involve statements (as opposed to the myriad of tactics involving such things as
timing, inspection and agenda control) or the specific decision not to make a statement.
Further, all are designed to mislead to some extent. Second, each tactic specifically has been
recommended as useful in some of the leading books and articles in the field of negotiation.
See, e.g., G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 5, at 529, 537; H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE,
supra note 5 at 112-41; G. NwENBERO, FUNDAmENTALS OF NEGOTIATING 133-36 (1973), cited
in G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 5, at 520-22; G. WILLIAMs, supra note 29, at 73-86;
Baer & Broder, How to Prepare and Negotiate Cases for Settlement-Pointers for Plain-
tiff, 1968 TRIAL LAW. GuIDE 302, 306.
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A. Lying As a Negotiation Tactic
The first general tactic concerns lying and variations on lying.
Assuming borrower's lawyer is fully aware of the facts, may the
lawyer state:
1. My client has been investigating the possibility of borrowing
money. Bank X has agreed to lend him ten million dollars at prime
plus two percent. Can you match that?
Most people would agree that this outright statement, directly con-
trary to known fact, is a lie.
Knowing that the past three years have seen progressively de-
creasing sales, however, may the lawyer for the borrower say:
2. My client's company is on the move and poised for an expansion
which will double its sales.
Is this a lie, or is it merely acceptable puffery? Clearly, the state-
ment is designed to mislead; just as clearly, "on the move" is not
subject to precise definition.
Compare the following statement by the borrower's lawyer:
3. My client does not want to accept less than ten million dollars
at prime plus two percent.
On its face the third is the most truthful of the statements. The
lawyer's intent here is, however, as much to mislead as in the first
and second statements. The hoped-for interpretation is the same
for all.
Compare the third statement to the following:
4. My client will not agree to borrow any of your money unless you
agree to charge no more than prime plus two and agree to lend ten
million dollars.
Here we clearly have the excessive demand. Most people are aware
that as a normal rule people ask for as much as they can get. Does
this expectation, however, justify a distinction? "Will not" is much
different from "does not want to." It simply is not true that the
[Vol. 17:99
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client will accept only these provisions.31
On a philosophical level, a lie must be distinguished from
broader questions of truth and misrepresentation. 2 Defining truth,
of course, has given rise to much debate in philosophy.3 No at-
tempt is made here to place this discussion within this broad phil-
osophical debate. For our purposes, less refined defintions are
appropriate.
As used here, a lie is a statement made with the intent to
deceive which purports to state the existence, in unequivocal
terms, of facts or law contrary to the declarant's express
knowledge.34 This is a definition with which many philosophers
might disagree; 35 however, it does provide a convenient means of
distinguishing various negotiating tactics which a philosopher
might regard as involving lies, but which are more crudely distin-
guished by lawyers on an operational level. Under the above defini-
tion, all lying in a negotiation would be considered a violation of
DR 7-102(A)(5)2 6
B. Distinguishing Facts from Opinions
A statement by the borrower's lawyer that bank X is, contrary to
fact, willing to lend the money would be unethical. A.B.A. Informal
Opinion 128337 provides a clear guideline in this area. The ques-
tions presented in the opinion involved the representation of a cli-
31. Obviously the ethical questions raised by this paradox can become more complicated
by ambiguities in the fact situation. If borrower is not sure what he will accept, for example,
can the lawyer state "will not agree" and then add to himself "at this time, but maybe
later." There is a whole body of philosophical thought on such "mental reservations." See S.
BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIvATE LIFE 37 (1979). Such multiplication of
possibilities is beyond our scope here, but suffice it to say that the discussion that follows is
equally applicable to these variations.
32. See id. at 6 (stating that truthfulness is a moral question).
33. See generally F.H. BRADLEY, ESSAYS ON TRUTH AND REALITY (1944) (criticizing author
William James); W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM (1975); W. JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH (1975);
J.L. MACKIE, TRUTH, PROBABILITY AND PARADOX (1973); N. RESCHER, THE COHERENCE THE-
ORY OF TRUTH (1973).
34. This definition clearly is much narrower than many philosophers would say is justi-
fied. Professor Bok, for example, defines a lie as "any intentionally deceptive message which
is stated." S. BoK, supra note 31, at 14 (emphasis added). Acceptance of such a broad defi-
nition essentially would preclude negotiation since inherent in all negotiations is some ele-
ment of an attempt to mislead the other side. White, supra note 4, at 927.
35. See supra note 34. One distinction, however, which is consistent with the present
discussion and a more philosophical approach, is that lying is a subcategory of deception. S.
BOK, supra note 31, at 14.
36. See supra text accompanying note 8.
37. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1283 (1973).
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ent who would authorize expansion of his suit into a class action
only on the condition that he would not be liable for any increased
costs associated with such expansion. The first issue addressed was
whether counsel could advance these additional costs and subse-
quently be reimbursed out of any judgment award that might be
obtained. The Ethics Committee stated: "[Ilf [the costs] are not
placed by the court on some other party or the class, the lawyer
should not bring the class action." 38
Having placed the limitation, the Committee then addressed the
question, may the lawyer "use the threat of a class action to bring
about a settlement favorable to his client?"' 9 In a blanket prohibi-
tion, the opinion stated "[i]t would not be proper to misrepresent,
in settlement negotiations, that a class action might be brought
when in fact it could not ethically be brought in view of the client's
unwillingness to assume ultimate liability for the class action
costs."'40 The first statement above that Bank X is, contrary to
fact, willing to lend the money and the statement in A.B.A. Infor-
mal Opinion 1283 that the client, contrary to his stated intention,
will bring a class action appear indistinguishable.
In fact, one finds it difficult to distinguish the statement prohib-
ited in Opinion 1283 from a number of common statements made
in negotiation. It is clearly a logical extension to prohibit such
statements as those of a lawyer threatening to bring suit initially
when it is known that the client will not go to court, as well as
those statements of rock bottom figures when the lawyer knows
there is flexibility.
Our second statement concerning the company being "poised for
expansion" raises more difficult questions concerning truthfulness.
It could be argued that this is not a statement of fact, but merely
statement of an opinion and therefore not a lie. Barnes v. Barnes41
is an interesting example of the distinction based on statements of
opinion versus statements of fact in a negotiation setting. In
Barnes, the decedent left all his property to his wife as long as she
remained unmarried. Upon remarriage or death the property was
to be divided among the wife and seven children. The wife secured
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. See generally Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Whitaker, 42 Ohio St. 2d 1, 325
N.E.2d 889 (1975) (improper to name client as inventor knowing that he is not the
inventor).
41. 207 Va. 114, 148 S.E.2d 789 (1966).
[Vol. 17:99
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the release of one daughter for the remainder. A son's lawyer then
sought a release of the wife's stepson (apparently for his mother's
benefit), stating in his letter that the wife was not obligated to
leave the stepson anything, "and if nothing is done, I doubt very
much that he [the stepson] will get anything when she dies. 42
The trial court found that the stepson had been misled. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia, however, held that there was no fraud or
misrepresentation in the statement. The court stated "this was an
expression of opinion as to the correct interpretation of the will
... . It is well settled that misrepresentations which amount to
fraud . . . must be positive statements of fact and not mere ex-
pressions of opinion. '
Would the result have been different had the lawyer written "I
know that he will not get anything when she dies"? Probably not,
since given the context, the statement could still be taken as noth-
ing more than an opinion. In our original hypothetical case, is
there a distinction between "it is our belief (or opinion) that this
company is on the move" and the same statement simply omitting
the word belief or opinion? There really is no distinction.
The futility of saying a distinction exists is apparent in the at-
tempt to distinguish fact from opinion. The problem is not unlike
distinguishing fact from opinion in the evidentiary context. This
distinction, as McCormick pointed out, between fact and opinion is
"the clumsiest of all the tools . . . It is clumsy because its basic
assumption is an illusion."" The distinction is based merely on
how "concrete" the statement is. "Facts" require fewer inferences
for interpretation than do "opinions." The more concrete the
statement, the less it is subject to competing inferences, and the
more likely it is to be a "fact."45
Furthermore, because all statements of fact are, to some degree,
merely opinions, involving inferences drawn from observations, it
makes little sense' to require an explicit statement that this is "my
opinion." This type of approach clearly would fall within the con-
templation of Model Rule 4.1 and its comments, indicating that
puffery is permissible.46 Puffery always has been likened to giving
42. Id. at 120, 148 S.E.2d at 794 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 121, 148 S.E.2d at 795.
44. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 23 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
45. Id. at 22-26.
46. See infra text accompanying note 66.
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an opinion, which essentially is a statement of one's interpretation
of given facts.4 7 At some point, however, the line is crossed and the
lack of competing inferences makes the statement a lie. For exam-
ple, the attorney would be lying if he said "my client did not run
the red light," when the client has admitted she did run the light.
Some facts are more subject to competing inferences than
others. Consequently, an analysis of the type of fact offered in the
negotiation may aid in determining whether the statement is opin-
ion or lie. Transactional facts are those facts related to the situa-
tion being negotiated and are often more susceptible to interpreta-
tion. Examples of transactional facts would include, in a litigation
setting, facts relating to an automobile collision and, in a setting
involving a business transaction, facts concerning the quality of the
leased premises. More latitude in the definition of fact may be in-
herent with these "transactional facts," and the argument that
there is no such thing as the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth is particularly applicable.4
The standard to be applied to transactional facts is similar to
the standard applied to a lawyer's arguing of law. The Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility states that a lawyer is permitted to con-
tend the existence of any fact which can reasonably be inferred
from the existing circumstances.49 Just as the lawyer may make an
argument that the law dictates a certain result, even though he
does not personally believe that the argument should be successful,
a lawyer may make all reasonable assertions even though he does
not personally believe that these asserted facts are true. The law-
yer, however, may not assert as a transactional fact anything that
he knows is not true or anything that cannot reasonably be in-
ferred from the information available to him.50
47. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 282 (2d ed. 1977).
48. Dr. Johnson's oft quoted statement is particularly appropriate. "Boswell asked: 'But
what do you think of supporting a cause which you know to be bad?' Dr. Johnson re-
sponded: 'Sir, you do not know it to be good or bad till the judge determines it.'" 2 Bos-
WELL'S LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 47 (G.B. Hill ed. 1887), quoted in M. FREEDMAN, supra
note 1, at 51.
49. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1981);
M. FRANKEL, supra note 20, at 24.
50. There is the obvious problem of what precisely a lawyer knows to be the truth. As
Professor Bok states, however, even though no clear lines can be drawn, information that
would indicate truthfulness can be adequate for such a determination. S. BOK, supra note
31, at 13. Intentional ignorance provides no defense. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE Standard 4-3.2 commentary (2d ed. 1979); M. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 35-36; see
also United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964) (Evidence was sufficient to
[Vol. 17:99
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Facts of a transactional nature often can be distinguished from
those facts which are related to the authority to settle which a cli-
ent has given to his attorney or facts related to planned actions. In
a pre-trial negotiation, for example, these are facts such as the
amount for which the parties are willing to settle or whether the
parties are contemplating the pursuit of certain legal actions. In a
case involving joint planning rather than litigation these facts
might include the willingness of a party to lease a building or the
ability of the lawyer to commit the client. These facts, like those in
Informal Opinion 1283,51 are less subject to individual interpreta-
tion than transactional facts. To the extent that the lawyer is
aware of a fact, puffing and opinion are much less likely to be
acceptable.
Certainly, basic outer limits can be discerned. The plaintiff in
Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines52 was injured while
in the military service. Counsel for the defendant, in obtaining a
release for $500, told plaintiff that civilians might get more com-
pensation because "[t]hose in the service . ..were in a different
situation in the eyes of the law because they obtained from the
Government, free of charge, medical and hospital care and were
also entitled to disability payments. . . .-5 In voiding the release,
the court held the lawyer's statement to be a false statement of
law, and that it was "inconceivable [that it was made] without
knowledge of its falsity or without. . . reckless disregard for the
truth."5
Similarly, In re Wines55 involved a lawyer engaged in personal
injury representation. In a nine count information, Wines was
found guilty, among other things, of making misrepresentations. In
filing claims, he stated that medical expenses of ninety dollars and
eighty-five dollars had been "incurred, '56 when the actual expenses
were only sixty-five dollars in each case.5 Furthermore, Wines had
submitted false car repair receipts. 8
establish knowledge on part of auditor who prepared finance statements used to defraud
investors).
51. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
52. 183 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1950).
53. Id. at 550.
54. Id.
55. 370 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1963).
56. Id. at 334.
57. Id. at 330.
58. Id. at 334.
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Both Sainsbury and Wines, as opposed to Barnes,59 depict more
clearly impermissible negotiation techniques. Both are also entirely
consistent with Informal Opinion 1283,0 which also turned on a
fact situation less subject to individual interpretation. In our bor-
rower-lender example, above, these cases indicate that puffing
would not allow the "creation" of another offer to use as leverage.
The statement concerning business expansion would also be uneth-
ical, given the statement's concrete nature.
The third and fourth statements set forth above present more
difficult problems than the first two statements set forth above.
These statements demand resolution of the following question:
Whether an unequivocal excessive demand is ethical or whether an
excessive demand must be stated in equivocal terms. Examination
of the third statement-my client does not want to accept less
than ten million dollars-reveals that it is both truthful and ethi-
cal. Objectively, such statements are truthful, even though
designed to mislead. Clearly a philosophical argument may be
made that lying even includes the stating of truths designed to
mislead; however, on a practical level such argument is indefen-
sible, since many negotiation techniques necessarily involve mis-
leading the opponent. This type of misleading, yet precise, lan-
guage would have made the lawyer's conduct in Informal Opinion
12831 acceptable. For example, had the lawyer in 1283 said "This
case is ripe for expansion into a class action," there would not have
been an ethical problem.
The importance of the precise language used has been recog-
nized by some courts. In In re Brown,6 2 Brown, an attorney repre-
sented a woman who had borrowed $200 from a bank. In the
course of that representation, Brown wrote the bank that he had
filed a suit on behalf of his client to settle an estate, and that the
client expected to receive $600 from the estate. Relying on this let-
ter, the bank loaned the client an additional $200. In fact, Brown
had not filed suit. The court rejected Brown's defense that he
meant to say his client intended to file suit. In upholding the Trial
Committee's recommendation of a reprimand, the court stated:
"[a]n attorney's willful making of a false statement, even though
not affecting a court or his client, but the interest of a third person
59. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
61. Id.
62. 279 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1955).
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relying thereon, constitutes grounds for disciplinary proceeding
against him."' 3
The law as to misrepresentation provides useful guidance in de-
ciding when language has not been precise enough. McVeigh v.
McGuerren5 4 illustrates a relatively straightforward example. In
McVeigh, the defendant, an attorney representing plaintiff's for-
mer husband, knew that the husband had inherited $20,000, but
nevertheless stated to plaintiff that if she was planning to collect
$18,000 due under a property settlement agreement she might as
well forget it, because the husband was "broke." Plaintiff, relying
on the attorney's statements, executed for $1,250 a release of the
indebtedness under the property settlement agreement. The court
held that plaintiff was entitled to recover damages from defendant
in an action of fraud brought by her in her own behalf and on
behalf of her children. An out-and-out statement that the husband
was "broke" was simply contrary to fact.
The "does not want to" in the third statement set forth above is
much more precise than the statements in both Brown and Mc-
Veigh and appears proper. Consider, however, opening positions in
negotiations which are traditionally higher than what will often be
acceptable. Must an excessive demand be so precise? Some com-
mentators would seem to say not. Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Re-
porter for the American Bar Association Commission on Evalua-
tion of Professional Standards, echoing the Commission's
comments, has stated that "[c]onventions governing social inter-
course do not require strict truthfulness at all times. On the con-
trary, those conventions give license to make certain kinds of state-
ments that are literally false." 5 The comment to Model Rule 4.1
reflected this position when it stated that what constitutes a fact
"can depend on the circumstances." 6 The comment acknowledges
that, despite any apparent truth to the statement, "[u]nder gener-
63. Id. at 774; see also In re Gladstone, 16 A.D.2d 512, 229 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1962) (involv-
ing, inter alia, findings that lawyers had "cause[d] to be submitted to... carriers bills of
particulars, medical reports, medical bills, and, in at least one instance, a spurious letter,
containing willfully exaggerated or knowingly false statements of the injuries, medical ex-
penses or loss of earnings").
64. 117 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1940).
65. Hazard, supra note 4, at 182-83 (quoting White, supra note 4, at 926-27). But see In
re Wines, 370 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1963) (rejecting just such a defense), supra note 55 and
accompanying text; infra note 92 and accompanying text.
66. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 comment (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
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ally accepted conventions in negotiation certain types of state-
ments ordinarily are not taken as statements of fact. '61 Examples
of such conventions"' are estimates of price or value, a party's in-
tentions as to an acceptable settlement, and the nondisclosure of a
principal unless it would result in fraud."'
To the extent that "conventions" allow a false statement, the
commentary would appear on its face to be contrary to Informal
Opinion 1283. The conventions allowing less than complete truth
would be unethical, unless we imply in such statements more pre-
cise language such as "what my client wants" or "what my client
will accept at this instant" in place of "what my client's bottom
line is." At a minimum, usage of such implied statements must be
limited to contact between lawyers. If we limit such usage to law-
yers, however, must we not also be concerned with education of
lawyers as to what are the existing "conventions." Unless it is ethi-
cal to state the implied "convention," the bar must face the follow-
ing problems: 1) Ethics are going to vary from area to area, and
hence, "accepted" conventions will not be known among even ex-
perienced lawyers; and 2) new lawyers, unaware of the "accepted"
conventions, must seek their knowledge from other people who
may have varying opinions on ethical proscriptions which have de-
veloped without systematic discussion. Consequently, one is
tempted to suggest that statements such as "my client does not
want" are preferable to conventions suggested by the Model
Rules."0
67. Id. But see M. FRANKEL, supra note 20, at 82.
68. See supra note 66. "Conventions" is an appropriate term since the Commission cites
no opinions authorizing such statements. The current formulation of the Model Rules and
its accompanying comment can be contrasted with an earlier version where the rule man-
dated that a lawyer "be fair in dealing with other participants." The comment then pro-
vided, "If]airness in negotiation implies that representations by or on behalf of one party to
the other party be truthful." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 4.2 comment
(Discussion Draft 1980), quoted in White, supra note 4, at 928. Responding to commentary
that the rule was too general in the sense that it failed to recognize the relativity of truth,
the Commission adopted the present Rule 4.1, essentially replicating DR 7-102(A)(5).
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 4.1 (Proposed Final Draft 1981). See M.
FRANKEL, supra note 20, at 82.
69. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
70. Intimately wrapped up in this debate is the fact that the attorney-client privilege is
also at work. Monroe Freedman has stated it well in his review of Judge Marvin Frankel's
work:
[Judge Frankel] begins with the proposition that lawyers know a great deal of truths
about their client's matters .... He then proceeds to the notion that if lawyers were
to share that knowledge with their clients' adversaries and judges, there would be
more truth in the legal system. This is wrong, or, at least it is correct only in the short
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C. Avoidance Techniques and Nondisclosure
1. Avoidance Techniques
A second set of tactics which raises questions of truthfulness is
nondisclosure. May the lawyer, for example, simply not inform the
opposing party of a material fact? Consider our original borrower-
lender hypothetical case. If the president of the borrower has can-
cer and the lawyer knows that the president's reputation for integ-
rity will be an important factor in the outcome of the negotiation,
the lawyer may not say "the president is in excellent health." Is
there a distinction, however, between this blatant lie and a deci-
sion simply not to bring up the matter?
Related to refusal to inform is an assortment of tactics called
avoidance techniques. These techniques may be used by a lawyer
to fend off specific inquiries with the hope of misleading his oppo-
nent. Three specific examples will illustrate the point. Assume the
borrower's lawyer asks the lender's lawyer: "What is your standard
interest rate for this type of loan?" Lender's lawyer, desiring to
avoid being pinned down to a figure that is too low, tries an avoid-
ance technique. Knowing that the bank would like to lend the
money for this type of business at prime rate plus three percent,
what is the ethical standing of each of the following approaches?
1. Leaving the opponent with the assumption the question was an-
swered, lender's lawyer says "We have no standard charge." What
the lawyer has done is answered very precisely the question asked,
not the question the opponent more likely intended to ask (What is
the interest rate your bank would normally charge me?)
2. Narrowing the focus of the question and then answering it in-
completely, the lender's lawyer says "We really don't have a stan-
dard charge since each loan is different." The lawyer ignores that
part of the question regarding "this type of loan."71
3. Restating the question to his liking, the lender's lawyer says
"you mean, is there a price we always charge no matter who the
run. The inevitable result would be that clients would withhold the less pleasant and
comfortable truths from their lawyers.
Freedman, Lawyer-Client Confidences and the Constitution (Book Review), 90 YALE L.J.
1486, 1496 (1981) (reviewing M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980)). See generally ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1476 (1981) (duty of lawyer
to preserve confidences and secrets of client in multiple representation from co-clients).
71. A related example is responding to compound questions by answering only one part.
For example:
Q: "How much will you lend me and what will be the interest?"
A: "We can lend you as much as your operation demands."
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customer is and no matter how much he wants to borrow?"
There are numerous variations of the above avoidance techniques,
but they all have a single thread. The lawyer makes an apparent
effort to answer the question while, at the same time, concealing
information and misleading the opponent. The effect of such tac-
tics is the same as if the lawyer lied; indeed, some philosophers
might even consider such tactics to be lies.72
In re Cadwell73 raises interesting questions whether failure to
disclose information with an intent to mislead is unethical. Cad-
well was, in an unrelated matter, suspended from the practice of
law for five and one-half years. After serving a twenty-two month
jail term, Cadwell began working as a paralegal. A man came to
Cadwell's place of employment and was referred to Cadwell be-
cause the attorney was out. Cadwell interviewed the client, told the
client that the client's wife was seeking a divorce, and received au-
thorization to write one letter and hold one conference. At no time
during the interview did Cadwell say he was a lawyer nor did he
say he was a paralegal. Following this interview, Cadwell tele-
phoned the opposing party's counsel stating "[t]his is the office of
Mr. Blanchard and my name is David Cadwell. 7 4 During this con-
versation, a tentative settlement was reached. Cadwell then sent a
letter to opposing counsel signed "LESTER L. BLANCHARD, BY
Cadwell.' 7' Again, no mention was made of Cadwell's status.
Eventually, the judge who approved the settlement realized that
Cadwell had been suspended. The only indication ever given to the
opposing party that Cadwell was not a lawyer was a letter sent by
Cadwell to opposing counsel during the same month that the judge
made his discovery which indicated Cadwell was a legal assistant.
There is no indication whether the letter came before or after the
judge's discovery. In upholding the finding that there had been a
violation of ethics, the California Supreme Court stated that "Cad-
well's conduct in holding himself out as practicing law while under
suspension involved moral turpitude . . . . A member of the bar
should not under any circumstances attempt to deceive another. '76
Cadwell raises serious questions regarding the use of some very
72. See infra text accompanying note 44.
73. 15 Cal. 3d 762, 543 P.2d 257, 125 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1975).
74. Id. at 768, 543 P.2d at 260, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
75. Id. at 769, 543 P.2d at 260, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
76. Id. at 771-72, 543 P.2d at 262, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
[Vol. 17:99
TRUTHFULNESS IN NEGOTIATION
common negotiation tactics. Does the court mean that failure to
disclose information with an intent to mislead constitutes decep-
tion? If so, much of everyday negotiation is unethical. If we go
back to our borrower-lender hypothetical case, many of the tactics
discussed rely on the lawyer's intentionally withholding informa-
tion so as to mislead and deceive the other side as to his position. 7
Clearly, however, we cannot expect lender's attorney to begin by
saying, "here is my bottom line," and then disclose relevant
information.
Under the Model Rules, a lawyer negotiating a contract is pro-
hibited from failing to disclose when "[iln the circumstances fail-
ure to make the disclosure is equivalent to making a material mis-
representation. 7 8  Failure to disclose, however, is rarely a
misrepresentation. 9 Since the Cadwell court was quite explicit
that no harm was caused to either party by failure to disclose, it is
hard to imagine that Cadwell's failure to disclose was material,
much less a "material misrepresentation."' 0 If the court meant to
say that the failure to disclose was not material, Cadwell could not
have violated either DR 7-102(A)(5) or Model Rule 4.1. Which
leaves the question, what ethical provision did Cadwell violate?
Did the court mean merely that it is improper for one to deceive
another as to one's professional status by a calculated effort to
avoid disclosure, even absent a specific question? If the Cadwell
court had restricted its holding to statements regarding profes-
sional status, there would be less difficulty in applying the decision
to another set of facts. Perhaps one's identity as a lawyer (or as a
non-lawyer) is so central to the relationship among members of the
bar that it justifies a rule forbidding all forms of deception. Such a
rule, requiring disclosure, would not be unprecedented. The Model
Rules provide that a lawyer representing a client before an admin-
istrative hearing must identify himself as such.81 In fact, there is
authority that an attorney acting in a representative capacity
should always disclose, his role. 2 Given the court's failure to dis-
77. See White, supra note 4, at 928.
78. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1(b)(1) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
79. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 47, at 287-92.
80. See supra note 78.
81. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.9 (Proposed Final Draft 1981). See
also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); 2 U.S.C. § 267(a) (1976).
82. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 26 (1908); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBiLrrY DR 7-106(B)(2) (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.9
comment (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
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cuss the matter adequately, it is difficult to know if it intended to
limit its holding to either of these two narrow views.
Regardless of how Cadwell is interpreted, certain matters of
form are so important that it is improper to fail to apprise the
other side. One of the key factors in determining the applicable
rules or conventions of a particular negotiation is who are the par-
ticipants. If conventions control, the rules change depending on
whether the other side is represented by a lawyer. The rules as to
what tactics are permissible change and, as a consequence, what
actions are expected from the other side also change. The other
side is either bound by the conventions or is not bound, and the
other side's expected adherence to standards higher than those of
the general business market clearly should affect how one weighs
the information one obtains. Looked at this way, Cadwell is a spe-
cial area where there. is an increased obligation that would come
under DR 7-102(A)(3) providing that a lawyer shall not conceal
"that which he is required by law to reveal." 3
2. Nondisclosure
As stated, avoidance techniques are closely related to nondisclo-
sure, and the distinctions between ethical and unethical conduct in
dealing with avoidance are just as difficult. Silence, as stated,
would not generally constitute unethical conduct, absent some ad-
ditional legal obligation. Of course, any number of situations arise
in specialized areas where a specific legal obligation imposes a duty
not to use silence or avoidance techniques.84 The three most com-
mon situations involving increased legal obligations (from the
standpoint of reported decisions) are those where misrepresenta-
tions with respect to contracts are involved, where the lawyer is
acting as an officer of the court as well as adversary, and where the
lawyer is subject to securities regulation laws. An examination of
these three areas gives us not only a specific look at ethical obliga-
tions involved in specialized areas, but also provides a source of
information from which we can draw analogies to more general
practice, including the specific tactics under discussion.
83. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3) (1981); cf. infra note
110 and accompanying text.
84. E.g., Truth in Negotiations Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a), (a)(14), (g), 2306(a), (f),
2310(b), 2311 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-20 (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982); I STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 3 (2d
ed. 1980).
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a. Misrepresentation
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(3), as stated, provides that a lawyer
shall not "conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is
required by law to reveal.""s A.B.A. Model Rule 4.1(b)(1) provides
that a lawyer shall not "knowingly fail to disclose a fact. . . when
in the circumstances failure to make the disclosure is equivalent to
making a material misrepresentation" and (b)(3) requires disclo-
sure if "necessary to comply with other law."' s6
"[I]n a bargaining transaction there is generally no duty to dis-
close information to the other party." 7 As a general rule, there-
fore, DR 7-102(A)(3) and Model Rule 4.1(b) do not require disclos-
ure. In the law of contracts, however, there are six basic exceptions
to the rule that disclosure is not required.88 The drafters of the
Model Rules adopted the essentials of the exceptions in the Legal
Background Comments to Rule 4.1(b). Four situations specifically
are identified as requiring disclosure, three of which relate to nego-
tiation:89 A lawyer has a duty to disclose where 1) the lawyer, hav-
ing made a statement he believes to be true, later finds out that it
is false; 2) the lawyer knows that materially false statements or
omissions have been made by the client or agent of the client; and
3) disclosure is required "to prevent a statement made by a lawyer
from being so materially misleading as to be a misrepresenta-
tion." 90 Although the first two exceptions are relatively straightfor-
ward, the cases with respect to the third exception-partial disclo-
sure by the lawyer or half truths- 91 are a source of useful
guidance in negotiations since once the lawyer abandons silence in
any negotiation, the possibility of conveying half truths arises.
There are numerous "half truth" cases. In Wines, previously dis-
cussed,92 alleged misconduct involved taking medical reports and
preparing "resumes" or summaries of their contents and submit-
85. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3) (1981).
86. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1(b)(1), (b)(3) (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
87. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 47, at 288.
88. Id.
89. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUT Rule 4.1 notes (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
90. Id.
91. Cf. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 47, at 288-91.
92. In re Wines, 370 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1963); see supra text accompanying note 55; see
also Newell v. Randall, 32 Minn. 171, 19 N.W. 972 (1884) (partial disclosure of debt); Smith
v. Pope, 103 N.H. 555, 176 A.2d 321 (1961) (no duty to disclose, but once purport to dis-
close, must not mislead with half-truth).
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ting them to insurance companies. In summarizing the reports,
Wines omitted information harmful to his clients. Furthermore, he
prepared the summaries in such a manner that they appeared to
be originals, except for the word "resume" typed at the top. The
court, rejecting a defense based on custom, stated that any mate-
rial omission would constitute a misrepresentation.
A custom may not be regarded as a complete vindication when a
lawyer is charged with misrepresentations. We agree that a lawyer in
his negotiations... may give as much or as little medical informa-
tion as he pleases .... But when he gives any, it should not be in
such form as is likely to mislead or deceive .... 9
In Scofield v. State Bar of California,9 4 Scofield, a lawyer, repre-
sented a couple who was involved in two car accidents within two
weeks of each other. Scofield filed identical claims against two sep-
arate insurance companies for the combined amount of damages.
At no time did Scofield tell the separate insurance companies that
there had been two accidents.95 In suspending Scofield, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that he had committed fraud by "suppres-
sion of that which is true . . . to deceive another." '
Half-truth cases such as these provide direct guidance as to
proper conduct. Returning to our examples, it would appear all
three statements are permissible. Assuming none of the statements
literally is untrue, the bank's lawyer has no obligation to disclose
further information. None of these statements misleads the bor-
rower concerning the substance of the eventual arrangement. The
lender, having chosen to talk, has given the full truth, and there-
fore, no problem of half truth arises.
Scofield and Wines involved charges of unethical conduct. In
distinguishing between ethical and unethical conduct, misrepresen-
tation in contract cases may provide guidance.9 7 If the conduct
rises to the level of an intentional material misrepresentation, re-
93. In re Wines, 370 S.W.2d at 334.
94. 62 Cal. 2d 624, 401 P.2d 217, 43 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1965).
95. The companies were aware, however, that two identical claims had been filed since
this information was shared by insurance companies through the Los Angeles Index Bureau.
96. 62 Cal. 2d at -, 401 P.2d at 219, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 827. See also Cole v. Lumbermens
Mut. Casualty Co., 160 So.2d 785 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (release invalid because injured child's
father induced to sign by implied representation that there was only one insurance policy);
In re Malloy, 248 N.W.2d 43 (N.D. 1976) (failure to disclose second insurance policy).
97. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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quired in contract law if fraud is to be found, the conduct should
certainly be unethical, since materiality is not necessary for disci-
plinary action.98 Care must, nonetheless, be taken in using misrep-
resentation cases to determine the presence of unethical conduct.
The areas of contracts and professional responsibility do not com-
pletely overlap. It is conceivable that a lawyer could violate princi-
ples of contract law relating to misrepresentation and not violate
proscriptions of unethical conduct. Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart,
Brown & Baerwitz e illustrates the differences. In Roberts, the law
firm wrote a letter for a client expressing its opinion that the cli-
ent's entity constituted a general partnership. The firm knew the
letter was to be used to secure a loan. Plaintiff, relying on the let-
ter, granted a loan to the client. Some of the fourteen partners
subsequently claimed to be limited, rather than general partners;
and consequently, plaintiff sued the law firm for fraud and
misrepresentation.
In reversing a dismissal by demurrer, the court recognized that a
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation had been stated.
The firm, the court held, may have been negligent in failing to dis-
close facts concerning the uncertainty of the general partnership.
This holding is consistent with the idea that contract law controls
negligent and innocent misrepresentations as well as intentional
misrepresentations. 100 It does not follow, however, that the firm's
negligence was unethical. Negligent misrepresentation is not a vio-
lation of any standard requiring knowledge.101 Although it may vi-
olate other ethical rules requiring competent representation, it is
not an intentional, and hence unethical, misstatement.102
When speaking of intentional misrepresentation, however, the
standards applied to both ethical and contractual problems are
98. See In re Cadwell, 15 Cal. 3d 762, 543 P.2d 257, 125 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1975), discussed
supra in text accompanying note 73; McKinney v. State Bar, 62 Cal. 2d 194, -, 397 P.2d
425, 426, 41 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (1965) ("immaterial whether any harm was done"); see also
infra text accompanying note 99.
99. 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976).
100. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 47, at 277-81.
101. Id.
102. This situation, of course, must be distinguished from intentional ignorance. It has
been pointed out that "knowledge may be shown by proof that the lawyer 'deliberately
closed his eyes to facts he had a duty to see ... or recklessly stated as facts things of which
he was ignorant."' MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 4.1 comment (Proposed
Final Draft 1981). Even this language, however, does not go so far as to say that mere negli-
gence constitutes knowledge. Deliberate ignorance always has been rejected as an explana-
tion of lack of knowledge. See generally supra note 50.
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quite similar and, as a consequence, commentators and the A.B.A.
Model Rules10 3 repeatedly analogize to misrepresentation in the
law of contracts. For instance, puffing illustrates this similarity. As
stated above, most commentators recognize the weakness of any
distinction based on fact versus opinion. 04 Indeed, it is this weak-
ness that provides at least one rationale for puffing; 05 other ration-
ales have also been posited for allowing puffing in the contracts
area, at least one of which strengthens the connection between eth-
ical and contractual liability. 06 Puffing is justified on the theory
that the opponent has no right to rely on certain types of
statements.
10 7
If a person has no right to rely upon the statement of a lawyer
because it constitutes mere opinion, the ethical and contractual
standards are the same. Furthermore, to the extent that the law of
contracts takes into account individual education and experience,
it is consistent with ethics, though ethics may require a good deal
more. As stated in Kendall v. Wilson,08 "the law will afford relief
even to the simple and credulous who have been duped by art and
falsehood." 09 If ethics are designed to require more than common
behavior, it seems reasonable to assume that a bar association
should also protect the "simple and credulous." 0
Finally, recognition should be made of one major difficulty in
103. See, e.g., White, supra note 4, at 932; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
4.1 comment (Proposed Final Draft 1981). There are numerous cases dealing with lawyer
misrepresentation on a contracts level. See, e.g., United States v. Marin, 651 F.2d 24 (1st
Cir. 1981) (lease invalidated because induced by misrepresentation); Valerio v. Boise Cas-
cade Corp., 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981) (court's approval of class action settlement ob-
tained by fraud); Southern Ry. Co. v. Steward, 115 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1940) (settlement
induced by fraud). See generally cases cited in MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 4.1 notes (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
There are fewer cases where the lawyer, having breached the contract standard of misrep-
resentation, has been disciplined. See, e.g., The Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City v. Cockrell, 274
Md. 279, 334 A.2d 85 (1975).
104. See supra notes 44 & 49 and accompanying text.
105. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 47, at 283.
106. Another justification for puffery is the immateriality of the statements. Id. at 279. As
discussed previously, however, immateriality has not stopped courts from disciplining law-
yers. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. But see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 4.1(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (disclosure required when failure to disclose
would be material misrepresentation); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476 comment c (1932)
(injury is not relevant to claim of misrepresentation).
107. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 47, at 279, 283.
108. 41 Vt. 567 (1869).
109. Id. at 571, quoted in J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 47, at 280.
110. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 47, at 282.
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drawing guidance from a misrepresentation case. "Misrepresenta-
tion" is as nebulous a term as misstatement of fact. As has been
stated: "Whilst I had little difficulty in deciding on the morality of
a single given case, I found it much less easy to lay down any gen-
eral rules or definitions ....
b. Negotiations with the Court
Much of the discussion involved in advocacy ethics has stressed
the conflict between the duty to the client and the duty to the
court, and also, to a lesser extent, to the public in general.' 2 It is
not the purpose here to rehash this debate. It is sufficient to say
that most courts would hold that a special duty is owed to them-a
duty which would make what is permissible in private transactions,
impermissible in court transactions.
The courts' expectation, of course, impacts on negotiation in at
least two ways. First, much of a lawyer's dealing with judges in
court involves the same process as negotiation. A lawyer does, in
fact, negotiate with a court, and special requirements as to ethical
conduct apply. Second, many of the tactics used in negotiation find
expression in the litigation process. The initial negotiation de-
mand, for example, may appear in the plaintiff's complaint.
Di Sabatino v. The State Bar,' I3 provides an interesting example
of nondisclosure, which may be ethical in private negotiations, but
unethical when appearing before a court. In Di Sabatino the peti-
tioner, a lawyer, represented three defendants charged with a
crime who were arraigned and for whom bail had been set at
$50,000 each by a commissioner. Later in the day, the lawyer ap-
peared before a municipal court and requested that the bail be re-
111. Id. at 284.
112. See supra note 1.
113. 27 Cal. 3d 159, 606 P.2d 765, 162 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1980). See also Jackson v. State
Bar, 23 Cal. 3d 509, 591 P.2d 47, 153 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1979) (duty to refrain from misleading
court); Sullins v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 609, 542 P.2d 631, 125 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1975) (duty to
not mislead court); People v. Kendrick, No. 81SA446 (Colo. Mar. 1, 1982) (available May 28,
1982, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file); Cooper v. State, 261 Ind. 659, 309 N.E.2d 807
(1974) (attorney's brief was self-serving and in violation of DR 7-102(A)(5)); King v. Pollard,
160 Ind. App. 209, 311 N.E.2d 454 (1974) (misstatement of record violated Canon 7); State
v. Phelps, 266 Kan. 371, 598 P.2d 180 (1979) (false statement in motion for new trial); Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n v. Dungan, 586 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1979) (perjury by lawyer); Louisiana State
Bar Ass'n v. Edwards, 387 So.2d 1137 (1980) (simulated transactions and foreclosure consti-
tuted fraud on court); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Levitt, 286 Md. 231, 406 A.2d
1296 (1979) (misrepresentations in motion to dismiss appeal); Commonwealth v. Gibbons,
378 Mass. 766, 393 N.E.2d 400 (1979).
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duced. The judge refused the request. That evening, the lawyer
went to the bail commissioner for the superior court. The lawyer
told the commissioner that he had appeared in court with his cli-
ents, but did not mention the two previous bail reduction motions.
In upholding disciplinary action against the lawyer, the court
stated that
[p]etitioner clearly had an affirmative duty to inform Commissioner
Ziskrout fully and completely as to all relevant facts and circum-
stances regarding his request for bail reduction. The fact that the
commissioner could have asked about the existence of prior bail re-
duction motions does not relieve petitioner of his duty of disclosure.
It is disingenuous to suggest that a bail commissioner asked to take
after hours action would consider it irrelevant that two prior mo-
tions for bail reduction had been denied.
14
The dissent, however, characterized the incident as being trivial
in nature. It pointed out that
[t]he superior court commissioner could not have been deceived for
he was advised bail had been set at $50,000 and he was being asked
for a reduction to $10,000. Since it was his duty to independently
determine the appropriate bail, the conclusion-actually the mere
deferment of action-of a judicial officer at a lower level should have
been of no significance. 115
The case is interesting in that the dissent alludes to what is a
sound basis for requiring disclosure to a court. To the extent possi-
ble, the court does not take an active role in the development of
the facts of the case, and for the most part, the court is unable to
verify independently the assertions made by the parties. Because
of this reliance on the parties to bring out facts and since failure to
disclose is more likely to mislead the court, a higher duty is
imposed. 116
Despite this higher duty, the dissent infers that the commis-
sioner should not have been misled by this particular failure to dis-
close. The failure to disclose was trivial and not a proper subject
for disciplinary action. Under these circumstances the superior
114. 27 Cal. 3d at 163, 606 P.2d at 767, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
115. Id. at 165, 606 P.2d at 768, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 461 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
116. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROESSIONAL REsPONSBLrrY DR 7-102, -103, -106,
-108 to -110 (1981).
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court commissioner should not rely solely on the parties to bring
out the relevant facts. Regardless of whether the commissioner was
in fact misled, the distinction implicit in the dissent's analysis has
direct applicability to more traditional negotiation settings. If one
of the reasons why failure to disclose is unethical when dealing
with a court is that there is a greater likelihood that the court will
be misled, then the less ability the parties have to develop the
facts themselves, the more likely the failure to disclose a relevant
fact will constitute unethical conduct.
c. SEC Rule 10b-5
The frequent citation to cases involving Rule 10b-5 in the A.B.A.
Model Rules reflects the applicability of this security regulation
rule to negotiation situations. The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of intdrstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
117
The similarity of Rule 10b-5 to the ethics of negotiation is strik-
ing. Clause 1 prohibits fraud, clearly within the contemplation of
ethical standards. Clause 3 is very similar to clause 1 and, as has
been pointed out in discussing SEC Rule 10b-5, "[n]othing comes
to mind that would be in clause 1 but not in clause 3.''118
Clause 2, however, provides more interesting problems. First, the
rule prohibits untrue statements of material facts. The basic dis-
tinction between Clause 2 and DR 7-102(A)(5) is the word "mate-
rial" (if we may assume "false" is the same as "untrue"). Interest-
ingly, the Model Code and contract misrepresentation differ in the
same manner.119 This distinction is understandable given the dif-
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
118. A. BROMBERG, SECuRITIEs LAW: FRAUD, SEC RuLE 10B-5 49 (1968).
119. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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ferent goals involved-regulating professional conduct versus regu-
lating commercial transactions.1i 0
Clause 2 of Rule 10b-5 also requires disclosure of a material fact
in order to insure that previous statements are not misleading. To-
tal silence, therefore, does not violate clause 2, just as silence is
generally permissible when dealing with misrepresentation in con-
tract law.121 Silence may, however, constitute fraud in some cir-
cumstances and therefore may be proscribed by clauses I and 3.122
The correlation between Rule 10b-5 and ethical standards of ne-
gotiation is even greater since the United States Supreme Court's
recent decisions requiring scienter for there to be a violation of
SEC Rule 10b-5.12' Both DR 7-102(A)(5) and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 4.1 use the term "knowingly," and hence, im-
ply that scienter is required. One might conclude that anything
which violates SEC Rule 10b-5 should also violate DR 7-102(A)(5)
and Model Rule 4.1, but because the materiality requirement in
10b-5 is lacking from DR 7-102(A)(5), much that would pass mus-
ter under SEC Rule 10b-5 would not under DR 7-102(A)(5).
Concern has been expressed over the lack of specificity in SEC
Rule 10b-5 even more than its lack in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Consider, however, the argument most commonly
used to reject any increased specificity:
[S]ince the importance of a particular piece of information depends
on the context in which it is given, materiality has become one of
the most unpredictable and elusive concepts of the federal securities
laws. The SEC itself has despaired of providing written guidelines to
advise wary corporate management of the distinctions between ma-
terial and non-material information, and instead has chosen to rely
on an after-the-fact, case-by-case approach, seeking injunctive relief
when it believes that the appropriate boundaries have been
breached. 124
120. See generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 118; Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the
Attorney-Client Privilege: In Search of an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the
Adversary System, and the Corporate Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASTINGS
L.J. 495 (1982).
121. A. BROMBERG, supra note 118, at 51.
122. See supra text accompanying note 79.
123. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hockfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976).
124. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977). See generally, Fiflis, Soft
Information: The SEC's Former Exogenous Zone, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 95 (1978).
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The similarity of this language to that concerning misrepresenta-
tion and DR 7-102(A)(5) is striking.125
Returning to our hypothetical case of negotiation, how do the
nondisclosure and avoidance tactics stand up ethically? Failure to
disclose the president's cancer would not be unethical, since gener-
ally, disclosure is not required and there does not seem to be any
special relationship between the borrower and the lender. The
avoidance techniques are also ethical, since no half truths were
stated. The information given-though of limited value and
nonresponsive-was complete.
IV. ALTERNATIVE Two: CAVEAT LAWYER
Failure to articulate appropriate conventions, whether done will-
ingly, or out of frustration with the difficulty of the task, is merely
to ignore the problem. The question of truthfulness should be
dealt with by the legal profession. If there is no ability, or, more
likely, no willingness to explore and state these conventions, a new
rule is needed to govern lawyer truthfulness. The profession, for
example, could justify adoption of a rule requiring absolute truth-
fulness. In other words, we could require a strict reading of DR 7-
102(A)(5). Absolute truth, however, is not an acceptable approach.
If the rules we have are difficult to enforce, adding such a rule
would only increase violations without any corresponding increase
in the ability to regulate. Furthermore, absolute truthfulness con-
flicts with too many other ethical obligations, such as client confi-
dentiality, to be a practical solution.
An alternative that would work, however, is the following: in ne-
gotiations, absent a clearly expressed specific duty to the con-
trary-such as to a court-caveat lawyer. A rule by which a lawyer
knows that anything goes when dealing with other lawyers has sev-
eral advantages. The ease with which it could be administered is
readily apparent. Since lack of truth generally would impose no
risk of discipline, lawyers need not be concerned that ethical pro-
scriptions could be violated with impunity. If we cannot enforce
the rules, it may be advisable to eliminate them. Caveat lawyer
would also be consistent with most of the limited authority ex-
isting with respect to truthfulness in negotiation. Statements vio-
125. See supra text accompanying note 111. But see Blackstone, A Roadmap for Disclos-
ure vs. A Blueprint for Fraud, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 74 (1978) (the SEC fears greater defini-
tion of materiality would "invite corporations to circumvent disclosure"). Id. at 75.
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lating Rule 10b-5 would still be prohibited, constitutional require-
ments would still demand disclosure by the prosecutor, and
agreements would still be subject to principles in the law of con-
tracts with respect to misrepresentation. Furthermore, caveat law-
yer would control dishonesty in negotiation as much as any alter-
native rule. Although no empirical data are available, few lawyers
conform their conduct to any articulated rule solely to avoid ethi-
cal misconduct. Peer pressure and the desire to maintain an appro-
priate reputation play important roles. Consequently, caveat law-
yer may do little to change the behavior of most experienced
lawyers acting within their own geographic area or professional
stratum. When a lawyer crosses a stratum or geographic boundary,
caveat lawyer merely makes explicit the understanding any compe-
tent lawyer would take with him.
Finally, caveat lawyer would effectively abolish the schizoid na-
ture of existing guidelines. These guidelines, established by the
A.B.A. Code and the Model Rules, would not have to be qualified
by commentary which states that certain misstatements are not
misstatements. There even seems to be increased morality in elimi-
nating a public position that is not honored as written.
V. CONCLUSION
A variety of circumstances have been suggested as requiring va-
rying degrees of truthfulness in negotiations. Although Professor
Hazard has recognized the difficulty of simultaneously developing
rules for "Type A Lawyers and Type B Lawyers," '126 courts have
accomplished a similar feat with Type A customers and Type B
customers in Uniform Commercial Code settings.1 27 Furthermore,
specificity is not unknown in negotiation settings. The Truth in
Lending Act 125 is a prime example of very specific negotiation
guidelines. An even more varied control is found in the Truth in
Negotiation Act which, although specifically referring to the armed
services, requires disclosure of a wide variety of specific informa-
tion by government contractors.129
126. Hazard, supra note 4, at 195.
127. See supra text accompanying note 109.
128. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-08, 1610-13, 1661-67 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), discussed in J. WHELAN & R.
PASLEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 435 (1975); Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1976); STANDARDS FOR CRIINAL JUS-
TICE (2d ed. 1979).
129. J. WHELAN & R. PASLEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
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The discussion has not come from the courts or the bar associa-
tions, and given the non-public nature of the negotiation process, it
is not likely to be forthcoming. 130 Interpretation might come from
public discussion and from recognition that guidelines beyond
mere "conventions," do exist. If the profession is unable or unwill-
ing to develop such a discussion, then the rules should be con-
formed to existing conduct.
Sir Frederick Pollock, in writing to Oliver Wendell Holmes,
stated "I never heard any real authority for any such proposition
as that one owes full disclosure of the truth to all men at all
times."131 One suspects he also never heard any real authority on
when one does not owe such disclosure.
435 (1975).
130. See generally White, supra note 4, at 926. One would hope that additional discus-
sion could be generated more precisely-for example, lawyers involved in real estate trans-
actions discussing their particular circumstances. It should be made clear that what is ad-
dressed here is what is ethical. The concern at this stage is with minimal levels of conduct,
not what should be done, but what can be done. See generally L. PATTEPON & E.
CHEArTHAM, THE PROrESSION oF LAW (1971); Blackmun, Thoughts About Ethics, 24 EMORY
L.J. 3 (1975).
131. F. POLLocK, HOLMES-POLLOcK LETTrrS 225 (1941).
1982]

